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Why Does Timor-Leste Remain Fragile?  
A Resource Dependence Explanation
Takeshi Daimon-Sato
This article focuses on the concept of “fragility,” which gained prominence in 
literature on conflict-driven countries and serves as an analytical tool for policy 
analysis. Using this concept, this article provides a review of Timor-Leste since its 
independence in 2002. The country has achieved high economic growth, though the 
economy has remained fragile in terms of its high dependence on external factors, 
namely oil revenues. This study suggests that foreign aid and investments do not 
automatically improve fragility in resource-dependent economies unless they help 
diversify the monoculture economy, based upon democratic consensus-building 
among stakeholders. 
Keywords  state fragility index (SFI), Timor-Leste, Indonesia, official development 
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Introduction
Peace is not built in a day. Starting as a de facto colony of Indonesia, with zero 
rule of law and no institutional framework in place, Timor-Leste has become 
a full-fledged nation-state with double-digit economic growth less than two 
decades after independence. It seems worth investigating what factors have 
contributed to the institutional building of Timor-Leste since its independence in 
2002.  
This article focuses on economic determinants of institutional building 
by trying to address the following question: can we look at Timor-Leste as a 
successful case for achieving peace and security? How can we tangibly assess 
stability? This article proposes fragility as a key determinant of peace and 
security, which can be improved by policy interventions such as foreign aid. In 
general, however, it is difficult to link aid to final outcomes—economic growth, 
agricultural development, poverty reduction, institutional building, and so on—
as these processes may well be called a “black box” (Bourguignon and Sundberg 
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2007). Added difficulty for opening the black box comes from the fact that aid 
money is fungible, even with earmarking (World Bank 1998). “Fungibility” has 
been raised in literature on aid effectiveness since the late 1990s (see World Bank 
1998), but has been re-examined in peacebuilding contexts beginning in the 
early 2000s (De Janvry and Sadoulet 2016). Aid agencies can certainly influence 
local policymakers, as most aid projects are conditioned to certain sets of policies 
(such as privatization, deregulation, tax increases, etc., as was the case during the 
heydays of the “Washington Consensus”), and it is possible at least quantitatively 
to trace the amount of aid and connect it with a rough post-aid assessment.1 In 
principle, all member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) are required to report on the relevance, efficiency, 
effectiveness, impact, sustainability, and coherence of their foreign aid projects. 
There are, however, external factors that influence impacts of projects, blurring 
the direct inference on linkage or causality between aid and outcomes (Easterly, 
Levine, and Roodman 2003; Rajan and Subamanian 2005). In a nutshell, any 
attempt to directly link input, output, and outcome is likely to suffer from 
statistical and policy-related biases.
Conceptually, though, donors have attempted to evaluate impacts or long-
run effects of policies and projects. A theoretically more correct way to show the 
impact of a project is what is widely known as the “Difference in Difference” (DID) 
method. Without getting into technical details, DID uses a large number of 
microdata, typically running from a few hundred to a few thousand households 
in treatment and control groups, to run a regression on the parameters of interest. 
A study conducted by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and 
Sophia University (2016) on the impact of development aid on peacebuilding 
used this approach to demonstrate positive effects on the number of education 
facilities and the percentage of citizens with access to toilets. The JICA-Sophia 
University study using DID estimation showed that, among the treatment group, 
a “trust” indicator shows positive improvement, implying that the development 
project has contributed to some aspects of increased social capital.  
On the other hand, another study was commissioned by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) in order to evaluate peacebuilding policy 
focused on Timor-Leste (MOFA 2011). The study was unique at that time in 
that it used time-series data from 1995 to 2008 compiled into the “State Fragility 
Index” (SFI) which was collected and scored by George Mason University. The 
formula for SFI at that time was simpler and reflected only limited information 
about conflict risks compared with the SFI currently in use. SFI used for this 
policy evaluation contained an “effectiveness score” and “legitimacy score” with 
25 being the highest score in the areas of security, politics, economics, and society. 
The usage of the constrained SFI was relevant in clarifying “significant correlation 
among the SFI, the probability of conflict occurrence, and the duration of 
conflicts” (ibid., 10).2 It turned out that, compared with other members of the 
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OECD, Japan was spending relatively less for countries with lower SFIs (for 
example, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, and Chad, to name a 
few among the lowest SFIs).
One additional attempt made by the above MOFA study was to quantita-
tively evaluate, albeit very crudely, the impact for reducing the “underlying 
risks of conflicts” as defined by SFI (ibid.). The regression results suggested that 
economic assistance in the form of official development assistance (ODA) flow 
was overall negatively correlated with SFI. The result should not be interpreted 
directly as ODA overall positively lowering the risk of conflicts in the sample 
periods of war, as the model was not robust enough to control for the so-called 
endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem occurs when the explanatory 
variable (in this case, ODA flow) is correlated with the error term; simply put, 
the ODA program is likely to be placed in a country in which needs are high, in 
this case countries with high SFIs. Also, an added limitation was that the model 
should have considered the change of SFIs over the years of analysis rather than 
in a single year (Daimon 2014). Despite these limitations, the study made a 
unique contribution to policy evaluation by unveiling some black box of linkages 
between economic assistance and the results on the ground in terms of reducing 
conflict risks.
The recent development of indexation of institutional fragility is significant, 
and it merits further investigation in terms of its measurements of peace. In 
order to address the question of determinants of institution building as stated in 
the outset, this article will provide some direct and circumstantial evidence for 
positive impacts of foreign aid in Timor-Leste using fragility as a central concept. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section reviews some 
theoretical background on using fragility and the pragmatic implications and 
applications for peace analysis in general. The third section develops a model of 
measuring effectiveness of aid from donors to Timor-Leste, using SFI, carefully 
touching upon key constraints of quantitative analysis and advantages of jointly 
using qualitative data. The final section concludes by summarizing the main 
findings with suggested policy implications.
Why Does Fragility Matter? A Rationale for Indexing Peace
One fundamental argument for using fragility as a central concept for under-
standing the situation in Timor-Leste lies in philosophical yet pragmatic obser-
vation that the “monopoly of legitimate violence and the degree of centralization” 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 80), tracing further back to Weber’s (1947) 
theory of state legitimacy, plays a key role for state-building, which is the very 
crux of the point in Timor-Leste. As argued by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), 
a society “descends into chaos, as did Somalia” unless the state achieves political 
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centralization, and obviously Timor-Leste had been left with no centralized 
political authority when it became independent in 2002. It remains doubtful even 
today that the process of centralization for state-building has been completed, 
as some degree of chaos seems to still prevail. I would argue that this lack of 
institutional stability shall be better captured by the concept of fragility, which 
should also better illustrate the real challenges facing Timor-Leste in the longer 
run. 
State fragility and its indexation have been around for a while in the economic 
development community, but recently it has won additional clientele in a wider 
policy market (World Bank 2005; OECD 2007, 2010). The term market may 
not be common usage but the word is intended to capture a bit of an ironical 
nuance regarding a herd of actors: diplomats, aid officials, scholars, consultants, 
NGO or religious volunteers, lobbyists, and the like. In 2017, a commission 
was established with former Prime Minister David Cameron as a chair in the 
United Kingdom aiming to address the issue of “escaping the fragility trap” for 
conflict-driven and poor nations in the world. The commission warned that 
“by 2030, half the world’s population will live in countries affected by war and 
instability. These countries are in a fragility trap,” where fractured societies lead 
to distrusted government, leading to weak institutions, thus insecurity, thus weak 
economies, thus vulnerability to shocks, then coming back to fractured societies, 
and this vicious circle lingers (International Growth Centre 2018). For foreign 
aid policymakers, therefore, it is critically important to address the syndrome 
of fragility (Collier, Besley, and Khan 2018). The fragility trap is reminiscent of 
the earlier concept of “conflict trap” widely known in development economics 
literature in the early 2000s (Collier et al. 2003). The conflict trap model assumed 
that there existed a linear linkage between economic resources and risk of 
civil conflicts. The policy implication is that the more foreign aid resources are 
targeted at eradicating or at least mitigating the economic causes of conflict, the 
less likely conflicts are to occur. This is consistent with what is known as the “greed 
and grievance” model (Collier and Hoefler 2004), where economic factors (such 
as gross domestic products, inequality, etc.) rather than political or social factors 
(such as religion and ethnic fragmentation, etc.) better explain the occurrence of 
civil wars. By 2015, however, the likelihood of conflicts was not cut in half, just 
as the number of poor people was not reduced by half per the target set by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Foreign intervention in the post-conflict phase—not in military but economic 
terms—could often adversely affect peace and stability due to coordination 
failures among donors and mismatches between donors’ and recipient’s needs. 
South Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan could be cited as examples where the local 
governance structure remains vulnerable against conflict risks despite or because 
of these interventions. Focusing on fragility, Daimon (2014) has shown statistical 
relationships between the volume of per capita economic assistance and the 
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decline in fragility—or vulnerability against conflict risks, which is a counter-
example of the coordination failure thesis. The result may be case dependent, 
however, and it has to be examined by case studies. Actually, the fragility index 
of Timor-Leste has declined after peaking in 2010. After experiencing political 
instability and insecurity during the first decade after independence from 
Indonesia, peaking in the resurgence of conflicts in May 2006, the country has 
maintained high economic growth and macroeconomic stability, depending 
upon oil and natural gas resources. The country resumed economic relations with 
Indonesia, which has become a major G20 economy. 
This article takes SFI as a key concept to capture an institutional vulnerability 
to conflict and violence, updated annually by the international think tank Fund 
for Peace (FFP), as a composite index based upon quantitative and qualitative 
surveys, composed of (1) cohesion indicators, (2) economic indicators, (3) 
political indicators, and (4) social and cross-cutting indicators (FFP 2019, 31-41). 
FSI of Timor-Leste for 2020 was reported as 82.7 points, or 2.8 points improved 
(lower) than the previous year. The SFI is a “critical tool in highlighting not only 
the normal pressures that all al states experience, but also in identifying when 
those pressures are outweighing a states’ capacity to manage those pressures” 
(ibid., 31). The SFI originates from the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), 
which was developed in the 1990s as a practical rather than theoretical tool kit 
for policymakers in conflict driven areas, which was intended at least to assess 
both quantitatively as well as qualitatively their institutional vulnerability against 
external and internal pressures, relative to other countries. The original version 
of FSI did not consider the cross-national dimension, whereas violence often is 
associated with cross-border terrorist activities, such as those committed by Al-
Qaida.  
FSI makes international comparison easier. In comparison, East Timorese 
SFI is ranked forty-seventh (FFP 2020) or roughly equivalent to the “worst one 
Source: Fragile States Index (2021)
Figure 1. State Fragility Index (SFI) of Timor-Leste
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third” among the oil rich countries. Indonesia ranks ninety-seventh, while South 
Korea is ranked 159th which is among the top SFI countries. East Timorese SFI 
is especially high in terms of “external intervention” which basically measures the 
level of dependence on foreign aid in economic and non-economic (military, for 
example) areas. “Demographic pressures,” measuring the extent to which a local 
economy (including agriculture production) can accommodate the population 
increase, also contributes to making East Timorese SFI high.
Some scholars argue that the emergence and circulation of fragility in the 
early 2000s among the development economics market are due mainly to the role 
played by the World Bank and OECD (Nay 2014). Other adjectives such as “failed,” 
“failing,” “rogue,” or even “collapsed” were also sold on the same market, quite 
cheaply, to mean countries experiencing conflict and severe poverty. As these 
institutions have significant powers to influence the all other stakeholders started 
consuming the term as if it were the international rule from then on, reminiscent 
somewhat of what was accepted as the Washington Consensus earlier by the 
similar process of “normalization,” “fragmentation,” and “assimilation” (ibid.). 
One concept after another, a new item is sold and vanishes in the next period. 
There are a few challenges to quantifying fragility from theoretical or ideol-
ogical perspective, however. From a radical anti-quantification school of thought, 
any attempt to quantify wellbeing has to be denied and rejected unconditionally. 
Social scientists less motivated with radical ideology still express their uneasiness 
with number crunching, disseminated through influential networks of interna-
tional development agencies such as the World Bank or United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). 
The well-known scoring and ranking of the Human Development Index 
(HDI), updated annually in the UNDP’s Human Development Report, has been 
under attack by various scholars. HDI, originally conceived as an additive average 
of per capita income, life expectancy, and literacy, made a major conceptual 
departure from the then dominant idea of income-based measurement of 
poverty and inequality. It is well known that Amartya Sen, a proponent of 
“development as freedom” or “poverty as capability failure,” influenced most of 
the conceptualization of HDI (Basu 1999, 49).
This article takes into account these non-utilitarian critiques, when SFI is 
used to assess Timor-Leste over time and across countries for peace, and will 
also differentiate outcome and input aspects of indicators. For example, for most 
development experts, economic growth is not usually considered as output but 
rather a development process towards alleviating poverty or inequality, though 
these can be used interchangeably and the distinction remains controversial 
among scholars.
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Application of Fragility Analysis for Timor-Leste
Historical Background
In terms of the occurrence of conflicts and violence, Timor-Leste today may not 
look as bad as Afghanistan or Iraq (Matsunaga 2019), as the economy is growing 
more and more prosperous and the society looks less vulnerable against conflict 
risks, especially compared with May 2006 when the newly independent nation 
was forced back into the pre-independence state of chaos (Leach 2017). Timor-
Leste is more prosperous thanks to revenue from natural resources, and also 
thanks to generous foreign aid from Australia where the East Timorese lobby 
remains apparently influential. National income has doubled over the past two 
decades. Nominal per capita income was US$790 in 2002, increasing to US$3,630 
in 2013, but declined to estimated US$1,820 in 2019 (World Bank 2019). In real 
terms, per capita income in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) rose from 
US$3,440 in 2000 to an estimated US$7,010 in 2019 (ibid.).
Given that its dependence on a monoculture (petroleum) economy has not 
changed, the nation still remains fragile in reality. Indeed, oil rents accounted for 
62% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007, was still as high as 42% in 2014, 
but has declined rapidly to less than 20% in recent years. International oil prices 
are volatile, making per capita income of this monoculture economy volatile and 
thus fragile as well.  
Going back into history, Timor-Leste was never an independent country or 
even an entity until 2002, and its institutional fragility was inevitably a national 
fate to overcome. There is a historical background of high fragility for the nation. 
To begin with, colonial powers divided Timor Island into two administrative 
units: West Timor under Dutch rule and East Timor under Portuguese control. 
Timor-Leste was under Portuguese authority for 460 years, with the exception of 
a brief period of Japanese military occupation (1942-45) and Indonesian occupa-
tion (1975-99), and UN trusteeship (1999-2002), which was called the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and existed until 
the independence of Timor-Leste in 2002. The Portuguese ruled East Timor 
through collaborators or elites who understood Portuguese, making the majority 
of the population illiterate with a weak or absent sense of national identity. While 
Portuguese influence declined over the post-war period, the Catholic Church 
played a central role for the East Timorese, remaining influential during much 
of the Indonesian period. The East Timorese economy depended greatly on 
external sources and the change in power from Portugal to Indonesia did not 
fundamentally improve the situation. 
During the Indonesian occupation, the transmigrasi or transmigration policy 
under President Suharto (1967-98) Indonesianized Timor Timur (meaning “East” 
in Indonesian) culturally and economically. By 1995, an estimated 180,000 persons 
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out of total population of 830,000 was Indonesian (largely ethnic Javanese) 
migrants. Timor Timur was considered the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia, 
whose head, the governor, was appointed by Jakarta. Centralization under Suharto 
strengthened Jakarta’s power but deprived local governments of administrative 
capacity. In a nutshell, Suharto’s policy was clearly intended to centralize resources 
in terms of capital and human resources. During the same period, all education 
was conducted in the Indonesian language, or bahasa Indonesia, significantly 
influencing the way of life in Dili and the elite class East Timorese during the 
occupation. The lack of institutional capacity in Timor-Leste may be due to their 
removal and exile from the power structure. It was no coincidence therefore 
that East Timorese elites were following a reformasi (reforms) political agenda 
after the Suharto regime ended, and Habibi was elected in 1998 (Leach 2017). 
The desentralisasi (decentralization) policy promoted under President Habibi’s 
reformasi agenda ignited the political forces to fly much beyond desentralisasi, 
mobilizing all layers of East Timorese population seeking separation and 
independence of Timor Timur from Indonesia in 1999. Habibi, known as a 
capable pilot, could not smoothly take off or land in terms of steering these 
movements, as clearly it was Xanana Gusmão, the charismatic independence 
leader still in prison in Jakarta, who was de facto dominating the “cockpit.”
Another key event to be remembered is May 2006 when violence was 
triggered and worsened by Mari Alkatiri, one of the leaders of the Revolutionary 
Front for an Independent East Timor, Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste 
Independente (FRETILIN), who served several terms as prime minister, the head 
executive, of Timor-Leste. Some studies go even further to argue that democrati-
zation with institutional fragility could invite violence as happened in May 2006 
in Timor-Leste (Tanaka-Sakabe 2019). Using time-series data of the conflicts, 
the same study provided quantitative evidence for this “democracy for violence” 
hypothesis. Though this study does not focus on what types of governance 
structures, namely liberal democratic, authoritarian, or religious charismatic, 
could work better or worse for the realization of peace, there seems to be a 
consensus: fragile state fails to achieve peace. This tautology is the crux of the 
fragility trap: fragility leads to less resilience to conflict risks that leads to higher 
fragility which again leads to higher vulnerability, and so on. The remaining 
question to be asked is whether fragility has been improved or worsened by 
the inflow of human and physical capital from abroad in Timor-Leste since its 
independence.
Input: ODA Flow
Jumping to a hasty conclusion about how to link ODA and the so-called peace 
results would provide only partial and often misleading interpretations, as the 
results on the ground could be better captured by careful examination of all 
aspects of the fragility index, as will be discussed in the next section, though the 
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overall impacts are positive on the surface as the actual incidences of violence 
have indeed decreased. A more thorough investigation should address how aid 
has solidified institutional resilience against various possible forms of violence 
and conflict risks, which is more conveniently explained by the SFI.
The predominant aid power for Timor-Leste since 2000 (before indepen-
dence) has been Australia (see Figure 2), though Japan has been the second or 
the third largest donor during the same period. Japanese ODA extended through 
the JICA has been mostly related to the improvement of economic and social 
infrastructure, namely roads, water, and some schools, which are not always 
directly motivated by peacebuilding, unlike Australian aid which has been 
more comprehensive and closely tied with security sectors. If and how these aid 
projects might have contributed to peacebuilding must be carefully investigated 
and evaluated. 
ODA is like, if not opium, a prescribed medicine. In the past in many 
countries, the medicine was overdosed (say during the initial “aid fever” for 
Afghanistan or Iraq), and aid money, as money is fungible, was used for other 
unintended purposes, and some was consumed by high-ranking officials or 
foreign advisors. Aid money can easily create corruption and rent-seeking, 
dependence on foreign experts, and interference with domestic institutions, all 
of which can lead to weakening the local institutions which are based on people’s 
trust for the governance structure (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2016). This line of 
thought could lead to the fragility trap dilemma: external technical advice could 
improve temporarily the efficiency or effectiveness of a project, thus leading to the 
improvement of SFI, as everything is done by highly paid expatriates. However, 
the effectiveness will not last long when these expatriates return home, because the 
Source: World Bank (2019)
Figure 2. Bilateral ODA (Net) Flows (unit: US$1 million)
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success of the project assumed bypassing existing or local institutional realities. 
In order to improve sustainability and keep the long-lasting effects of foreign aid, 
there is no short-cut but it is important for development experts to help local 
elites win the trust of local people so that they will support the local governance 
structure. This would eventually create a stronger sense of “rule of law” in the 
long run, making Timor-Leste look more like a real nation-state. Following this 
process of building trust among people, the fine-tuned foreign aid with long 
lasting efforts could help the country get out of the fragility trap.
Short-Run Output: Immediate Effects of Foreign Aid Programs on Peacebuilding 
Foreign aid has short-run and long-run outcome objectives and therefore must 
be evaluated accordingly. Australian aid policy, or the aid investment plan (AIP) 
as they call it, for Timor-Leste, for example, has three short-run objectives: (1) 
improved livelihood and economic development, (2) enhancing human develop-
ment, and (3) strengthening governance and institutions (Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019). While the first objective can provide an 
economic basis for peace and the second can help achieve human security, the 
third objective seems to be most directly linked to the peacebuilding cause. The 
AIP performance report (ibid.) concluded that the overall objectives have been 
achieved on balance, with some reservations as follows.
First, more progress needs to be achieved in the creation of employment. 
The Timor-Leste government had to reduce labor opportunities through public 
works such as national village development program and rehabilitation project, 
for which Australia provided technical assistance. Second, instances of inclusive 
policy development and improved policy implementation must be benchmarked 
with comparable indicators, which are largely missing. This is closely related to 
the third objective or institution building for peace and stability of the nation. 
Third, gender equality must be achieved. Australian aid has helped Timor-Leste 
to be aware of changed attitudes towards women who have often been victims, 
but the impact should be broadened to the entire nation.
On the other hand, there are some tangible short-run outcomes of peacebuil-
ding by foreign aid. For example, more police officers have been professionalized 
with the help of Australian aid by providing courses on a human rights-focused, 
community-based policing model for national police officers (ibid.).
Long-Run Output: Peace Outcomes of Timor-Leste Over the Past Twenty Years 
Long-run outcomes should be assessed in terms of whether the cumulative flows 
of foreign aid have positively and tangibly impacted the country in “promoting 
peaceful and inclusive societies, providing access to justice for all, and building 
effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” as Goal 16 of 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) states. I would argue here that this long-
run tangible objective can be captured by the achievement of better SFI, as it 
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is a composite index of social cohesion, economic performance, and political 
and institutional development, all of which are related to the core foundation of 
peacebuilding and state-building.
Cohesion Indicators: There are three “cohesion indicators.” First, the security 
apparatus indicator questions the institutional capacity of the state to ensure 
security for its citizens, and scores nearly 180 surveyed countries from 10 (the 
most fragile) to 0 (the least fragile) by asking, for example, “is the military under 
civilian control?,” “are there guerilla forces operating in the state?,” or “if in 
reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament, and 
reintegration of former combatants?”3 The second indicator is the fractionalized 
elites indicator which measures the fragmentation of state institutions along 
ethnic, class, clan, racial, or religious lines and ruling elite, by asking, for example, 
“is there a sense of national identity?” or “are the laws democratic or reasonable?” 
The third indicator is the group grievance indicator which focuses on divisions 
and schisms between different groups along social or political lines. This indicator 
asks, for example, “are victims of past atrocities compensated?,” “are war criminals 
apprehended and prosecuted?,” and “is there freedom of religion according to 
laws and practiced by society?” For Timor-Leste, the above indicators for SFI 
in 2019 are reported as 6.6, 8.3, and 5.9, respectively, suggesting that the “frac-
tionalized elites” indicator remains high (or vulnerable) while the other two 
indicators are relatively less vulnerable or improving. In other words, the sense 
of national identity is relatively weak in Timor-Leste, compared with other 
indicators of social cohesion. This level of fragmentation is comparable to 
Ukraine (with the same indicator being 8.0), which is divided into pro- or anti-
Russian camps over the Crimean annexation in 2014. The impending end of 
the Indonesian occupation in 1999 created an opportunity for Timor Timur 
(of Indonesia under newly elected Habibi) to unite when a large number of 
East Timorese shared animosity towards the Indonesianization policy under 
the Suharto regime, memorialized in the well-known Santa Cruz Massacre of 
November 1991. However, this anti-Indonesia social glue was quickly wiped out 
once independence was realized and huge economic problems (unemployment, 
in particular) emerged, revealing a lack of social cohesion. No one spoke the 
same language. When the nation became independent in 2002, no ordinary 
people in the streets of Dili and more so in rural places spoke the official language 
of Portuguese and, at the national parliament, elected officials spoke to each other 
through interpreters.4 The lack of social cohesion seemed to be the underlying 
root cause of the May 2006 setback for many observers, though the trigger was 
unmet demands by young soldiers for more work or higher salaries. 
Language plays a key role in establishing national cohesion. The linguistic 
map of Timor-Leste has seen some drastic changes since around 2010. With 
the Tetun language being used in public education, more people speak Tetun 
 Why Does Timor-Leste Remain Fragile? 103
than Indonesian across the nation, and especially in Dili. Tetun, developed as a 
Portuguese creole, has been serving as the lingua franca in Timor-Leste in recent 
years. In Timor-Leste, common language policy has contributed significantly to 
the achievement of higher literacy, which also has consolidated the sense of one 
nation.
Economic Indicators: Second, and perhaps more pertinent to the earlier “money 
for peace” hypothesis, are the economic indicators of (1) economic decline, (2) 
uneven development, and (3) human flight and brain drain, all of which have 
something to do with market. The first two may be measured in a straightforward 
manner with statistics such as GDP, the Gini coefficient, or other income 
inequality measures. The final indicator is more complex. One of the pertinent 
issues for Timor-Leste is the importance of “returning migrants” from abroad or 
the amount of remittance from diasporas, so it must capture human mobility to 
a large extent, which is sometimes not easy to monitor quantitatively as it may 
involve clandestine movement in one way or another. 
Timor-Leste as an economy remains vulnerable in all three dimensions. The 
prevalence of poverty, the unequal distribution of wealth (or fruits of growth), 
and dependence on external financing including foreign aid and remittances are 
captured in Timor-Leste’s scores in the above three indicators: economic decline 
(7.5), uneven development (6.8), and human flight and brain drain (7.6). These 
numbers remain high compared to the Philippines (4.9, 5.1, 6.0) or Indonesia (4.5, 
5.2, 6.9), implying that continued support for economic needs is unavoidable at 
least for the foreseeable future, even if it may not be desirable in the long run in 
order to gain complete independence economically.
Scores in economic indicators are consistent with objective indicators which 
also show overall signs of improvement over the past two decades (see Figures 
1, 2 and 3), though some points would merit explanation. Per capita income has 
shown overall improvement, pushing the country into the upper middle income 
tier of nations, albeit temporarily around 2010-2013 as these numbers declined 
significantly after the international oil price declined. This implies the volatility 
of GDP growth is high, reflecting the fragility of its monoculture economy 
as mentioned before. Unemployment remains high among the youth, with a 
significant gender imbalance disfavoring women. Young female job seekers are 
facing more serious constraints than male counterparts. Poverty and inequality of 
wealth distribution, which could arguably constitute one of the root determinants 
(if not the root cause) of social unrest, show signs of improvement, though 
poverty in rural areas remains dangerously high, with nearly half of the rural 
population living under the subsistence level.
In a nutshell, the economic basis of Timor-Leste remains vulnerable and 
fragile, as it depends on monoculture and flows of foreign capital (private 
and public), with the latter to be elaborated in the next section. With the 
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establishment of an “oil fund” in 2005, the East Timorese economy has been more 
prosperous. On the other hand, this means that the economic structure depends 
largely on oil revenue, and the International Monetary Fund recommends that 
Timor-Leste increase its economic diversification efforts (IMF 2019).  
Political Indicators: Third, the political dimension deals with the state which is 
still in the process of being built in Timor-Leste. “State failure” can explain many 
aspects of political, legal, or institutional fragility, including an “almost coup d’état,” 
as there was “no such nation as East Timor or East Timorese” (Ramos-Horta 
2017). The political indicator is composed of (1) state legitimacy (6.1 for Timor-
Leste), (2) public services (7.9 for Timor-Leste), and (3) human rights and rule of 
law (4.7 for Timor-Leste). State legitimacy considers the representativeness and 
openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. Public services 
Source: IMF (2019, 22)
Source: IMF (2019, 23)
Figure 3. Nominal GDP: Oil and Non-Oil
Figure 4. Revenue Structure
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refer to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. The human 
rights and rule of law indicator considers the relationship between the state and 
its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms 
are observed and respected. The score for Timor-Leste remains relatively high 
(or fragile) in all three aspects. There are certain degrees of openness in the 
political process, but the government has not won enough confidence among 
East Timorese, partly because the state is not delivering what has to be delivered. 
Democracy as narrowly defined as the existence of laws and elections (see 
Tanaka-Sakabe 2019, for example) does not strengthen any of these indicators, as 
democracy as understood in a wider political economy context goes beyond what 
is written in law to consider if democracy has become a social norm.  
In the law and economics literature, Basu (2000) convincingly argues that 
social norms, which are rooted in history and culture rather than modern laws, 
play more influential roles in the behavior of traditional communities, as “what 
can be achieved through the law can, in principle, also be achieved without law.” 
It is therefore important to distinguish between written laws and unwritten laws 
(which are usually considered social norms). “If a certain outcome is not an 
equilibrium of the economy, then no law can implement it” (ibid., 117). In many 
cases, laws in developing countries are often “a facade without a foundation” 
(Murrell 1996). This is the case even in Japan where modern civil laws prohibits 
discrimination based on gender, while in practice there remain many custom 
laws in favor of males from the choice of family name at marriage to the 
inheritance of property after the death of family members. These arguments are 
applicable to East Timorese context as well; otherwise how could we explain a 
significant gender difference in unemployment when the law guarantees equal 
opportunities? It is not democracy or laws but people’s support for the governance 
structure, or rule of law, that influences most state building, as long as Timor-
Leste wishes to follow the nation-state model in the traditional post-Westphalian 
sense of nation-state.
In this regard, there is an interesting survey conducted by the World Bank 
team in 2015.5 In Timor-Leste, 44.2 percent of surveyed firms replied that they 
have experienced at least one government official requesting a bribe, worsening 
from 16.1 percent in a survey conducted in 2009. This contrasts with 26.6 
percent average in Asian and 19.9 percent worldwide average. Indonesian firms 
responded affirmatively to the same question at a rate of 30.6 percent, also 
high but lower than Timor-Leste. Is bribery a part of East Timorese culture or 
a negative legacy from the Indonesian occupation? Not in figures, at least. To 
other questions such as “percent of firms expected to give gifts when meeting 
with tax officials,” “percent of firms expected to give gifts to secure government 
contracts,” “percent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint,” East 
Timorese firms’ responses were on average much higher than the Asian or world 
average. Timor-Leste will not become a truly independent nation-state unless 
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they overcome this constraint, as the rule of law is also an important form of “social 
capital” that is essential in “doing business together” with a sense of collegiality 
and cooperation. True, democracy does not eradicate bribery, but rule of law 
based on transparency does, which is based on people’s trust for laws and order 
implemented by the existing governance structure.
Social and Cross-Cutting Indicators: Fourth, demographic pressures, refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and external intervention are categorized 
as social and cross-cutting indicators. Timor-Leste scored 9.2, 5.7, and 9.2, 
respectively, comparatively high in all three dimensions. The demographic 
pressures indicator considers pressures from high population growth, asking if 
“the population growth rate is sustainable,” if “there is a system for controlling 
spreading diseases and pandemics,” or if “a natural disaster occurs, is there an 
adequate response plan.” Population growth is nearly 2 percent on average, 
doubling the population from 2000 in just two decades, from 0.6 million to 1.2 
million, which clearly has pressured the East Timorese economy downward. The 
refugees and IDPs indicator measures the pressure on states caused by the forced 
displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental, 
Table 2. Incidence of Bribery in Timor-Leste
Indicator Timor L Asia All
Bribery incidence (percent of firms experiencing at least one bribe 
payment request)
44.2 26.6 16.9
Bribery depth (% of public transactions where a gift or informal 
payment was requested)
27.5 20.4 13.2
Percent of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials 17.1 17.3 12.7
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to secure government contract 81.4 32.5 25.5
Value of gift expected to secure a governament contract  
(% of contract value)
14.5 1.8 1.6
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get an operating license 22.9 18.9 13.4
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get an import license 67.0 25.6 12.9
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get a construction permit 36.3 33.4 21.3
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get an eletrical connection 39.8 20.6 15.2
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to get a water connection 31.2 25.6 15.0
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to public officials “to get things 
done”
85.6 37.7 20.6
Percent of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint 8.4 23.0 33.1
Percent of firms identifying the courts sysstem as a major constraint 4.9 7.2 15.3
Source: World Bank (2017)
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or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee 
flows into others. The external intervention indicator considers the influence and 
impact of external actors in the functioning (security and economic) of a state, 
asking if “there is external support for factors opposed to the government,” if 
“foreign troops are present,” or if “the country is dependent on economic aid.” The 
country has received economic and military assistance from Australia, lowering 
the SFI score on external factors, though the Australian troops have withdrawn 
from the country and UN peacekeeping operations have ceased.
In summary, out of all twelve sub-indicators, none is output or outcome 
related and all of them are input or process (or means to achieve output/outcome) 
related. In other words, security apparatus, fractionalized elites, group grievance, 
economic decline, uneven development, human flight and brain drain, state 
legitimacy, public services, human rights and rule of law, demographic pressures, 
refugees and IDPs, and external intervention are not goals, but rather means to 
achieve higher goals that are not explicit in the SFI indicators. 
Concluding Remarks
This article has shed light on fragility as a key concept to better assess the process 
of state building in otherwise institutionally vulnerable circumstance, such 
as the situation in which Timor-Leste has struggled for the past two decades. 
Although aid effectiveness in general is an empirical question, this study shows 
the significance of a quantitative approach to peacebuilding efforts in the post-
Source: World Bank (2019)
Figure 5. Population structure of Timor-Leste, 2000-2018
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conflict circumstance in Timor Leste.
To summarize the main findings, the study has shown that Timor- Leste 
remains largely fragile to this day. Interventions have been made to reduce 
the fragility, though its effectiveness remains unclear. Foreign interventions 
include police reforms to achieve community-based and human rights-focused 
policing have been achieved through taking certified courses offered by technical 
assistance . In addition, it is well known that Timorese police introduced a 
Japanese style “police box” (or koban in Japanese) to monitor security and prevent 
crimes in the city. JICA also provided a technical assistance program for Timorese 
law enforcement officers to be trained for the community-based policing system. 
Higher literacy has been achieved with Tetun language being spoken at schools, 
many of which were built by foreign aid. A sense of trust has been achieved 
among people by improving communication skills. In the long run, it will lead to 
help buttress rule of law. Social inequity such as gender inequality and violence 
against women remains a social issue, though some progress has been made by 
foreign aid assisted awareness programs.
Aid money alone will not automatically improve fragility especially in terms 
of social cohesion and industrial base. East Timorese challenges in overcoming 
its reliance on oil cannot be solved by external assistance alone, and it needs to be 
supported by indigenous efforts with highly committed professional bureaucrats 
and policymakers. During Portuguese colonialization and Indonesian occupation, 
colonialists did not spend resources seriously for education, perhaps in fear of 
resistance. It turns out that a lack of human resources (e.g., lack of commonly 
spoken language) remains one of the key determinants of low social cohesion, 
which is in turn related to relatively high fragility of Timor-Leste. It is well 
known that the success of Indonesian industrialization since the 1980s largely 
depended on the technocrats called the “Berkeley mafia” who were educated in 
prestigious universities like the University of California-Berkeley. Unfortunately, 
in Timor Leste, there is no equivalent of the Berkeley mafia who can indigenize 
foreign ideas or technologies consistently with local social cohesion, making the 
country less fragile in the long run. Realizing this, the East Timorese government 
has recently started sending future leaders abroad in order to acquire the latest 
technology and investing more in engineering education, but education is not a 
quick-fix tool. We may need to wait another decade or so for the recent initiatives 
to lead to results. Fragility is not overcome in a day.
Notes
1.  For example, twelve evaluation reports have been published on the JICA website for 
East Timorese projects. 
2.  When SFI is over 20, the total duration of conflicts is projected to be 125 periods 
 Why Does Timor-Leste Remain Fragile? 109
(years) with more than a 60 percent probability (UNHCR 2009).
3.  These questions are selective and not all questions asked (FPP 2019, 34).
4.  These observations are based on the author’s own experiences from his series of visits 
to Timor-Leste from 2002-10. Since around 2010, Tetun has become widespread in the 
country.
5.  This survey was conducted in Timor-Leste between September 2015 and June 2016.
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